Conventional wisdom has it that natural resource dependence is associated with increased vulnerability to external shocks emanating from sudden supply and demand changes in the global economy. This paper explores to what extent government revenue in low-and middle-income countries is affected by different kinds of shocks and whether these effects are different for resource-rich as compared to non-resource-rich countries. Based on data from 176 countries between 1980-2010, we measure the elasticity of tax revenue in resource-rich countries with respect to two kinds of shocks: exchange rate pressure and terms of trade shocks. We find that government revenue in resource-rich countries is more volatile, but not necessarily more vulnerable, in particular with regard to terms of trade shocks. Poorer resource-rich countries are more vulnerable than their higher-income counterparts. Vulnerability in resource-rich countries has significantly decreased in the 2000s as compared to previous decades. Introducing institutional variables such as political regime type or bureaucratic quality we find that the general institutional characteristics of a country may not always reflect the quality of its management of natural resources. Still, results provide some support to those arguments that stress the relevance of good governance in the context of the so-called "resource curse".
Introduction
Conventional wisdom has it that countries with a high dependence on natural resource exports are particularly vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Their economies usually depend on a small range of export products with oscillating world market prices, making public revenue from these sources highly volatile. In addition, abundance of natural resources often leads to the crowding-out of investments in other sectors (the famous 'Dutch disease'), resulting in small tax bases.
But is this conventional wisdom corroborated by empirical findings? To be sure, a broad body of literature links abundance of natural resources to volatility of growth and revenue (Crivelli and Gupta, 2014; IMF, 2013) . But volatility does not equal vulnerability. In this paper, 'volatility' is taken as a measure of revenue instability, based on deviations around an observed (linear or exponential) trend. 'Vulnerability' refers to the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to different kinds of exogenous shocks. Concerning the latter, empirical research is rather scarce, especially with regard to developing countries.
In theory, resource-rich countries that are able to deal with volatile revenue sources through sound macroeconomic and fiscal management could be even less affected by external shocks than other countries. Or, put the other way round: High revenue vulnerability of resource-rich countries could also depend on other, including domestic, factors, such as for instance wide-spread rent-seeking, corruption, limited state capacity (Thies, 2010) or economic mismanagement (Raddatz, 2007) . To give an example, government revenue from mining in Zambia has oscillated between 5 and 18 per cent between 2002 and 2011, while at the same time the average government revenue take compared to the contribution of mining to GDP was less than a fifth of the ratios obtained by international benchmark countries such as Chile or Botswana. Zambia's poor performance has been linked to political instability and a critical lack of state capacity in the management of the mining sector (Lundstøl et al., 2013) .
Hence, the first puzzle this paper sets out to explore is whether natural resource dependence is associated with increased vulnerability to external shocks. We are particularly interested in the fate of poorer countries, as it can be supposed that they will find it more difficult to implement the sound policies mentioned above. The second puzzle analysed in the paper refers to the influence of governance factors on vulnerability. Following the resource curse literature we expect political regime type and state capacity to impact on the way governments deal with resource wealth (Andersen and Ross, 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Davis, 2013; Ehrhart and Guerineau, 2013; Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Liou and Musgrave, 2012; McGuirk, 2013; Ross, 2012a; Schaffer and Ziyadov, 2012; Wright et al., 2014) .
The paper explores the effect of two kinds of shocks on tax revenue in a total of 176 countries -the exchange rate pressure index, a proxy for export demand and foreign capital flows shocks, and terms-of-trade shocks. It compares resource-rich (RR) and non-resourcerich (non-RR) countries 1 regarding their revenue volatility and exposure to shocks. Further, it analyses whether countries behave differently according to income levels, political regime type and government effectiveness.
We find evidence that revenues of RR-countries are indeed more volatile than those of non-RR countries. They also face more volatile shocks -in particular with regard to terms of trade. Looking at the impact of shocks, however, a differentiated picture emerges. RR countries are not necessarily more vulnerable to external shocks. While exchange rate pressure affects RR countries more than non-RR countries, the effect is driven above all by poorer (low-and lower-middle-income) countries. With regard to terms-of-trade shocks, RR and non-RR countries are equally vulnerable and in both groups, revenues of poorer countries are more affected by this kind of shock. We also observe that RR as well as non-RR countries reduce the vulnerability of their revenue to terms-of-trade shocks in the 2000s, compared to the previous two decades. In the case of RR countries, this could be the result of a general improvement of resource management.
Finally, the introduction of governance-related indicators produces mixed results. For instance, democracies appear to fare better facing exchange rate pressure shocks than nondemocracies in RR countries, whereas results are inconclusive for non-RR countries. In contrast, terms-of-trade shocks seem to affect countries independently of their governance structure. The results suggest that the low quality of governance in general does not necessarily translate into poor governance of the resource sector, which is a major source of public revenue in resource-rich countries.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section develops the argument based on a discussion of the literature on shocks, revenue volatility and natural resources. Section 3 introduces the method and data used. Section 4 presents the findings of the econometric analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Literature review
The impact of natural resources on the volatility of economic growth is a well-established fact (for developing countries, see for instance Arezki et al., 2012) . Many observations point to a strong relationship between volatility and vulnerability. For instance, in a recent study on managing volatility, the International Monetary Fund observes: "research suggests that external shocks contribute to large output losses and protracted growth slowdowns in LICs" (IMF, 2013: 7) . The IMF paper continues: "A number of LICs face fragilities defined by their weak institutions, ongoing or recent conflict, and high poverty levels, which put them in a weak position to cope with the effects of shocks and to mediate their social impact. underlying structural and policy vulnerabilities could limit their capacity to absorb future external shocks, including through countervailing policy measures" (ibid., 8).
Contributions to the debate on revenue volatility or vulnerability in developing countries often refer to the "resource curse" (for instance, see Collier and Venables, 2008; Ehrhart and Guerineau, 2013; Frankel, 2010; Humphreys et al., 2007; Ross, 2012b; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2008; van der Ploeg and Venables, 2012) . Economically, large inflows of foreign currency from the export of natural resources lead to domestic currency appreciation and reduce competitiveness, investment and productivity growth in other sectors (the famous "Dutch disease"). In addition, price fluctuations in world markets make it more difficult to plan major investment projects and medium-term government budgets, as dependence on a few export products increases the vulnerability of public revenue systems to changes in the terms of trade (Araki and Claus, 2014; Loayza and Raddatz, 2007) . Furthermore, in the absence of competition the state's acquisition of the resource rent often leads to inefficiencies, which have an adverse effect on the development of the resource sector itself.
As a result, these countries tend to have a small tax base, and public revenues depend on sources that are more volatile than others (such as non-tax revenue from state-owned enterprises, for instance). States may escape the volatility-vulnerability nexus mainly by saving a part of the resource rent for countercyclical spending activities and by investing in the diversification of the economy (Gelb and Grasmann, 2010) . In an analysis of 44 countries, including 14 oil exporters, Buetzer et al. (2012) show that oil price shocks do not necessarily lead to exchange rate appreciation, as oil exporters tend to counter appreciation pressure by accumulating foreign exchange reserves.
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Some papers point to changes over time in this relationship. Ebeke and Ehrhart (2011) show that tax revenue instability (measured as the standard deviation of the log difference) remains high in sub-Sahara African countries but has declined from a peak in the late 1980s as the tax composition changed. Taxes on corporate income and trade tend to be the most unstable, so the gradual decline in overall tax instability is attributed to increased shares of relatively more stable indirect taxes. Tax instability tends to increase with instability of GDP, less consistently with dependence on natural resource rents, and in some specifications is lower in countries with higher trade openness (the trade volume measure) and per capita GDP (Ebeke and Ehrhart, 2011, Table 5 ). In a similar vein, Adler and Tovar (2012) observe lower levels of vulnerability to global financial shocks in Latin America and Asia over the last 15 years. Though limited, this is further evidence that instability is associated with exposure to exogenous shocks and related to the composition of revenue (see also Kaminsky, 2010) .
The relationship becomes more complicated, however, once governance factors are taken into consideration. It is here that the political dimension of the resource curse kicks in. Two factors account for it. First, a society derives revenue from the resource sector in the form of rents and so (to some extent) independently of its own efforts. This paralyses personal initiative, creates disincentives for domestic revenue mobilisation and weakens the monitoring of authorities in the institutional set-up (Hendrix and Noland, 2014) . At the same time, rents from natural resources can also be spent on state capacity -for instance, by building up a strong military and police apparatus. Second, the revenue goes primarily to the state, who distributes the bounty. Control of the state becomes an 'all-or-nothing' game if very few profitable activities are possible outside the public sector.
As a result, resource-rich countries often have inefficient or 'unbalanced' administrative structures. They are frequently plagued by distributive, resource-related conflicts and are also, on average, less democratic than resource-poor countries with comparable per capita incomes. Hence, the political resource curse impacts on (i) political regime type, (ii) state capacity and (iii) the incidence of civil conflict.
Several empirical studies explore the relationship of natural resource wealth and these dimensions. Some test the argument that rents from natural resources -in particular, from oil -affect the quality of political regimes or the chances of democratization. Key contributions to this debate have been made by Ross (2001; 2012a; 2014) who finds robust evidence on the stabilising effect of resource wealth on autocratic rule. This is in line with the theoretical arguments and empirical findings presented by other authors (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Hendrix and Noland, 2014; Tsui, 2011; Wright et al., 2014) and it has recently been corroborated by Prichard et al. (2014) who use a new dataset with more detailled information on natural-resource-based versus non-resource-based revenue. Still, it is unclear how this dimension of the resource curse should affect the vulnerability of revenue to external shocks. There are no compelling theoretical arguments supporting the assumption that resource-dependent autocracies would be somehow more exposed to external shocks than resource-dependent democracies. Hence, we would not expect regime type to have a major impact on the vulnerability of revenue in resource-rich countries.
Another line of research aims at testing the hypothesis that natural resource abundance has a negative effect on state capacity, mainly in terms of weak institutional checks and balances and high levels of corruption. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) provide evidence for an erosion of institutional checks and balances over time, due to resource rents. Sala-iMartin and Subramanian (2003) show that natural resource wealth has a negative effect on institutional quality in Nigeria. Besley and Persson (2010) and Knack (2008) argue that rents from natural resources and other sources create disincentives for leaders to invest in tax collection. Hendrix and Noland (2014) provide initial evidence on the negative association between resource rents and government effectiveness and corruption. In contrast, Thies (2010) finds that resource abundance has a mostly positive impact on state capacity, when the latter is measured in fiscal terms. Morrison (2009) shows that non-tax revenue increases social spending in autocracies. Among the influencing factors discussed in the literature are the short-term impact of windfalls (resource abundance) versus the long-term effects of natural resource dependence, as well as the differentiated effects of point-source natural resources versus diffuse resources (Ross, 2014; van der Ploeg, 2007; Werger, 2009 ). All in all, it seems that there is no clear effect of natural resource wealth on state capacity in general.
A third dimension is the impact of natural resources on civil war and violent conflict. Smith (2004) discusses the contrasting claims that natural resource wealth may either lead to increased levels of (distributional) conflicts in a society, or endows political leaders with additional resources to appease conflicts. He finds resource (oil) wealth associated with lower levels of civil war and anti-state protests, but protest levels to be pro-cyclically related to revenue from oil. To a certain extent, these results are echoed by Thies (2010) , who does not find robust evidence of a direct effect of resource wealth on civil war onset. In contrast, Ross (2014) holds that oil wealth helps to trigger violent conflict in low-and lower-middleincome countries.
To sum up, most of the available literature provides evidence on a concurrence of revenue volatility and vulnerability against external shocks in RR-countries. However, once governance factors are introduced in the analysis, we are presented with an analytical puzzle: While low state capacity and increased conflict would in principle be associated with higher vulnerability of revenue, it is by no means clear that natural resource abundance produces these effects. In contrast, regarding the effect of natural resources on political regime type and democratisation, evidence is much more robust, yet it does not seem to be conceptually linked to revenue vulnerability. Unfortunately, evidence is strong where the conceptual basis is weak, and weak where the conceptual basis is strong.
Methodological approach
The paper explores the impact of two different kinds of shocks on tax revenue in a broad range of countries. We take data from 176 countries, covering the period 1980-2010. First, we build measures of fiscal capacity and revenue volatility 4 for each country to characterize tax resilience features of the sample. These measures are regressed on a set of control factors in order to account for structural features of the economies. In identifying the control variables we follow the tax effort literature (for instance, see Bird, 1976; Fenochietto and Pessino, 2013; Gupta, 2007; Tanzi, 1992; Teera and Hudson, 2004) . Most of these studies use sector shares (mainly agriculture and manufacturing) and a composite measure of trade openness, such as the share of trade volume (imports plus exports) on GDP. However, sector shares are less suitable for panel analysis with annual data or short period averages, as changes are usually rather slow and follow a clear trend. Further, we assume that the effect of external shocks on revenue is influenced differently by imports and exports, as well as by the sectoral composition of trade.
Hence, we use the import/GDP ratio as an indicator of the tax base for tariffs along with export/GDP as an indicator of the performance of major sectors in the economy. With regard to the latter, we distinguish agriculture, minerals, fuels and manufactured exports. Treating each type of export separately allows for differential performance of separate parts of the economy, which may be related to external shocks and the tax structure. Thus, our basic specification is: Rev = f(agri_exp, min_exp, fuel_exp, manuf_exp, imports, agri_va, ln_GDP) + e (1) Tax revenue (Rev) is measured as a ratio of GDP. A broad measure of tax revenue is employed, including total government revenue except grants. This is the most appropriate measure when analysing resource-rich countries, as revenue from extractive activities is treated differently across countries, depending on the institutional arrangements. Agricultural exports (agri_exp), mineral exports (min_exp), fuel exports (fuel_exp), manufactured exports (manuf_exp) and imports (imports) are also measured relative to GDP. Logged GDP per capita (ln_GDP) and agricultural value added as a share of GDP (agri_va) are included as proxies for the level of development that is expected to reflect improvements in administrative capacity and tax collection efficiency.
To identify the effects of shocks on tax revenue in resource-rich countries, two types of shocks are analysed. Both shocks enter our regression as continuous variables.
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First, the ER pressure index (ER_pressure) has been widely used in the international finance literature (see Aizenman and Hutchison, 2012; Berg and Patillo, 1999; Buetzer et al., 2012; Candelon et al., 2010) to assess the impact of foreign capital flows shocks and export demand shocks. It is generally defined as a weighted average of percentage changes of policy variables in response to current account or financial account shocks. We use the following definition:
where i identifies the country, t is the year, E is the exchange rate in local currency units per USD, RES -size of reserves, and are country-specific weights:
. Here is the standard deviation of in country i in 1980-2012, is the same for .
The logic behind the index is that in response to an adverse balance-of-payment shock a country could employ different strategies: the government could devaluate the currency, 5 We also check for possible non-linear effects when the magnitude of shocks is particularly large. For each shock X, we define a dummy variable "X, large", which is equal to 1 if a shock is greater than the 90th percentile of the respective income group distribution. See IMF (2013) for a similar approach. However, we find no evidence for non-linear effects of shocks on revenue. See von Haldenwang et al. (2013) for more details.
but it could also use its international reserves to defend the exchange rate. Both policy variables should be considered in measuring the magnitude of external shocks. 6 We expect tax revenue in countries with developed capital and financial markets to be more vulnerable to ER pressure. Capital outflows affect above all the financial sector and those companies that are able to borrow abroad. These sectors typically pay larger shares of personal and corporate income taxes. At the same time, countries with sound and credible policies (e.g. countries with higher bureaucratic quality or countries with political regimes that enjoy more trust from the markets) are expected to be less vulnerable to ER pressure. For instance, the effect of capital outflows on the economy, and on financial intermediation in particular, is much stronger if a country's financial markets are not properly regulated.
The other shock that we use is the terms-of-trade index (ToT) -scaled as the unit-price of imports divided by unit price of exports. 7 The factor that likely increases vulnerability of government revenue to this shock is the reliance of tax system on trade taxes. Economies that are not sufficiently diversified and unable to quickly reorient their exports according to price changes, are also expected to be more vulnerable. Some countries may reduce their vulnerability to ToT shocks by establishing insurance mechanisms against these shocks. For instance, a number of resource-rich countries follow a fiscal rule, by which they save extra revenue in a stabilization fund when times are good, and then use revenue from the fund when times are bad. Countries with access to (and trust of) international capital markets may protect themselves against ToT shocks by adjusting their borrowing needs.
In order to identify the sign and the magnitude of the effect that a shock has on tax revenue, we use a fixed effects panel estimation:
where i is the country index, and t is the year index; rev is total revenue without grants (as percentage to GDP); w is external shock -ToT or ER_pressure X is the vector of our controls -agriculture exports, mineral exports, fuel exports, manufactured exports and imports, agricultural value-added and GDP per capita.  is a random error. Our interest is β. For any variable a, ä denotes its time-demeaned value:
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The weights in (2) are country-specific and chosen so that the more volatile series gets smaller weight. To reduce the impact of outliers, the ER pressure index is transformed as follows:
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In addition to these two shocks, we check for GDP decline as a proxy for a general output shock and for intensity of natural disasters, a measure based on people killed and affected by natural disaster in every year t and every country j (Fomby et al., 2009) . With regard to GDP decline, all coefficients are statistically insignificant and very close to zero. These results indicate that on average tax systems are neutral, i.e. the elasticity of revenue with respect to output is close to 1. With regard to natural disasters, we find that RR countries face less severe natural disasters shocks than non-RR countries, and their revenues are not significantly affected by them. The reason could be that extractive industries -the main sources of revenue in RR countries -are usually less affected by natural catastrophes than other types of economic activity, such as for instance agriculture. 
In analyzing the effect of shocks on revenue we account for the level of welfare using the World Bank country income groups and dividing the sample in high-and upper-middleincome countries (the "richer" countries) on the one hand, and lower-middle-and lowincome countries (the "poorer" countries) on the other hand.
As an additional focus we explore the behaviour of resource-rich vs. non-resource-rich countries in different time periods -in particular before and after the year 2000. This follows the idea that many resource-rich countries were able to improve their management of the extractive sector in recent years, partly due to the long commodity supercycle and the lessons learnt from previous decades.
We then divide the sample according to governance characteristics, in order to tease out possible effects of the "political resource curse". First we split countries according to their political regime characteristics, based on their Polity IV score: On a scale ranging from 10 to -10, a country is considered a democracy if its Polity IV score is higher than 5, and a nondemocracy if otherwise (see Marshall et al., 2010) . As a second measure we use the bureaucratic quality index from the ICRG data set.
Findings
Our findings show that the revenue structure of resource-rich countries, though more volatile than that of non-resource-rich countries due to a higher dependence on non-tax revenue, could be less vulnerable to external shocks. At least, there is no robust evidence pointing to volatility of revenue from natural resources being directly connected to increased vulnerability vis-à-vis external shocks. Table 1 provides a summary of government revenue volatility and size of shocks in RR and non-RR countries. Several conclusions can be drawn from the table.
Government Revenue Volatility and Shocks
( Table 1 around Second, RR countries seem to be more heterogeneous, as indicated by the higher standard deviation of the volatility index, as well as the spread between the 10th and 90th percentiles of the index distribution. Again, the heterogeneity among RR countries is largest in the 2000s, and smallest in the 90s, whereas the heterogeneity among non-RR countries is roughly stable throughout 1980-2010. Yet, of 37 RR countries for which government revenue data are available both for the 90s and the 2000s, almost two thirds (24) managed to reduce their volatility in the 2000s, whereas for some countries (in particular, Cameroon, Madagascar, Niger) the situation deteriorated significantly.
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The difference in average government revenue volatility between RR and non-RR countries could be a result of two factors. First, RR countries may be exposed to more volatile external conditions. Second, government revenue in RR countries may be more sensitive to external shocks due to other, including domestic, reasons. These two factors can commingle and work in the same direction, or they can offset each other.
As shown in Table 1 , RR countries do face more volatile external shocks, especially with regard to terms of trade. The standard deviation of ToT shocks to RR countries is 0.38 in 1980-2010, whereas for non-RR countries it is considerably lower (0.23). To illustrate, one standard deviation ToT shock in a non-RR country means a change of import-export unit price by 26 per cent, whereas in a RR country the change is 46 per cent. 9 RR countries also face somewhat more volatile exchange rate pressure shocks, but the difference between RR and non-RR countries is not that large in this case. For example, one standard deviation ER pressure shock in a non-RR country implies a change of exchange rate by 9 per cent (assuming international reserves are fixed). In a RR country a similar shock implies a change of exchange rate by 12 per cent.
Compared to the previous decades, the difference in volatility of ToT shocks between RR and non-RR countries is higher in the 2000s, which is consistent with the fact that the difference in total government revenue volatility is also higher in this period. At the same time, two thirds of RR countries improved the stability of their government revenue despite an increased volatility of shocks. This suggests that tax systems in RR countries may be less sensitive to external shocks then those in non-RR countries. Table 2 reports our estimation results for exchange rate pressure (ER) and terms of trade (ToT) shocks. For each shock we run fixed-effects regressions on all countries, and on RR and non-RR countries separately. Within each group, we also report the results separately for higher-and lower-income countries. All standard errors are clustered by country.
Regression Results: Pre-defined Groups
( Table 2 around here) 8 This may be related to greater dependency of these countries to natural resources in the 2000s.
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Note that the terms-of-trade shocks are in logarithms.
Looking at the whole sample we find that both shocks are significantly associated with lower revenue. The relationship is similar for higher-income and lower-income countries, although for ToT shocks the magnitude of the effect is clearly lower for the group of richer countries.
RR countries seem to be more sensitive than non-RR countries to ER pressure shocks. The result is driven by the sensitivity of lower-income RR countries, whereas for the higherincome RR countries the sensitivity is not significant in statistical terms. Interestingly, the situation is diametrically opposite for non-RR countries. In this group the revenues of richer countries are more sensitive to ER pressure shocks, while the effect for the poorer countries is essentially zero.
The difference may be explained by looking at the most plausible causes of ER pressure. In the non-RR group the difference between higher-and lower-income countries arises most likely because the richer economies, in particular their financial markets, are more deeply integrated and, thus, more exposed to the international capital flows. Hence, capital outflows may substantially affect revenue-generating sectors in the higher-income group.
The same is likely to be true in lower-income RR countries. They usually enjoy higher confidence of the capital markets (though probably confined to the extractive sectors) then their non-RR counterparts, many of which are hardly integrated at all in the world financial markets. Lower-income RR countries are also less likely to have enough institutional capacity to withstand capital flows volatility. Higher-income RR countries are less sensitive to ER pressure most likely because they rely less on tax revenue from the sectors directly related to the external capital flows. In addition, they should be in a better position to counteract the effect of shocks through fiscal and monetary policies. Our findings thus corroborate the results reported by Buetzer et al. (2012) on the behaviour of commodity exporters facing external demand shocks.
ToT shocks have a negative impact on government revenue for the whole sample, but looking at the RR and the non-RR groups separately we find that the effect is stronger and statistically significant for lower-income countries, independently of their endowment with natural resources. Higher-income countries in both RR and non-RR country groups appear to be less sensitive then their lower-income counterparts.
As discussed above, RR countries face more volatile terms-of-trade shocks. However, Table 2 shows that all in all RR countries are not more sensitive to these shocks. Rather, we observe a smaller sensitivity of RR lower-income countries.
The lower sensitivity of richer countries can be explained by the fact that most countries in this group do not rely heavily on trade taxes. In contrast, RR countries, both higher-and lower-income, do often rely on trade taxes (e.g. export duties on hydrocarbons). Besides, revenues from other sources -royalties, fees, profits from state-owned enterprises -also depend on commodity prices. Yet, lower-income RR countries are less directly reliant on terms-of-trade developments. This is most probably because the tax instruments of RR countries include items which are less elastic with respect to export-import prices, above all royalties and other license fees.
Looking at the effect of sectoral exports we find that governments in richer RR countries are clearly in a better position to cream off revenues from mining, drilling and manufacturing. Mineral exports appear to be associated with higher tax revenue in the higher-income countries, while the results for the lower-income countries are negative and statistically significant. Fuel exports are positively related to revenue in the whole sample and in the RR group, as could be expected. The differentiated impact of minerals and fuels shows, once again, that it is easier for resource-rich countries to collect rents from drilling compared to mining. The effect of manufacturing is mostly negative, with the exception of the higherincome RR countries. This latter result could be due to longer value chains in the extractive industries in these countries.
Governance indicators
In the next exercise we explore the effects of both shocks in different subgroups of RR and non-RR countries. First, we divide the sample according to political regime -democracies vs. non-democracies. Several studies suggest that the revenue systems of democratic regimes could be more resilient vis-à-vis external shocks (Ehrhart and Guerineau, 2013; von Haldenwang et al., 2013) .
(Table 3 around here)
When accounting for natural resource endowments, however, the results fail to provide clear evidence for a better performance of democracies. Owing perhaps to small sample size, evidence is indicative at best and could be driven by outliers -at least in the group of 16 RR democracies. For RR countries, findings point to a lower sensitivity of democratic regimes with regard to ER pressure shocks. In contrast, the point estimates of the effects of ToT shocks on government revenue are higher for democratic regimes.
Looking at non-RR countries, there is no evidence of differentiated patterns for democratic or non-democratic regimes. It appears noteworthy, however, that the difference between the political regimes is not very large, and about the same in RR and non-RR countries. On the one hand, in non-RR countries tax effort and trust in government are likely to matter more for revenue collection and the fight against tax evasion, which makes political regime a more relevant indicator for fiscal performance in these countries. On the other hand, transparency and accountability of revenue collection from extractive activities could matter in RR countries as well. As shown by other studies (see Garcia and von Haldenwang, 2015) , stable autocratic regimes may be as efficient in collecting taxes as democratic governments.
The second subgroup division that we consider is by time period -1980-2000 vs. 2001-2010 . The results are presented in Table 4 . Again, results mostly fail to reach statistical significance, but the picture that emerges is that RR countries managed their government revenue better in the 2000s than in the earlier period -the effects of exchange rate pressure and terms-oftrade shocks are essentially zero in 2000s. This may be the result of a general improvement of resource management in RR countries. In some countries transparency of fiscal regimes improved (for instance, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan switched from classified discretionary contracts for each new oil well to open legislature). Many countries implemented fiscal rules that would deal with the volatility of commodity prices (for instance, Chile, Norway, Russia, Nigeria, Mongolia). The situation is similar in non-RR countries, but only for terms-of-trade shocks, not for exchange rate pressure.
(Table 4 around here)
We also divide countries by the quality of their public sector (based on the bureaucratic quality index of ICRG). Results are presented in Table 5 . As it appears, bureaucratic quality seems to be more relevant for the resilience to ER pressure shocks than to ToT shocks. Table  5 shows that in the RR group ToT shocks affect tax revenue in high bureaucratic quality countries more than in countries with low bureaucratic quality. However, the result may once again be driven by outliers, as there are only ten RR countries with high bureaucratic quality in our sample. For non-RR countries low bureaucratic quality generally makes countries less resilient to external shocks, judging from the magnitudes of the coefficients, but only the group with low bureaucratic quality produces statistically significant results. All in all the results seem to reflect the ambiguous nature of empirical findings regarding the effect of natural resource wealth on administrative capacity, reported in Section 2 of this paper.
( Table 5 around here)
Concluding remarks
Countries rich in natural resources tend to suffer from higher degrees of revenue volatility, but this is not always a consequence of their exposure to exogenous shocks. Of the two kinds of shocks we have analyzed in this paper -exchange rate pressure and terms-of-trade shocks -the former seems to affect both RR and non-RR countries, albeit differently. Among the RR countries, those belonging to the lower income group are more vulnerable than the higher-income countries. At the same time, RR countries (especially the poorer ones) appear to be less affected by ToT shocks.
This finding is even more interesting as the shocks themselves are more volatile for RR countries than for non-RR countries. The standard deviation of both shocks -and of ToT shocks in particular -is higher for RR countries. In this regard conventional wisdom appears to be corroborated by the facts: Countries with a high dependency on natural resources face higher oscillations of world market prices, on average. Somewhat surprisingly, however, we find that the difference between RR and non-RR countries is highest in the 2000s, compared to the previous two decades, but the vulnerability of government revenue to shocks in RR countries is lower in the 2000s, indicating higher levels of management performance.
Is the character of the political regime associated with the vulnerability of government revenue in RR countries? Our findings show that non-democratic regimes could indeed be more vulnerable to ER pressure shocks, while results are inconclusive with regard to ToT shocks. A different picture emerges when looking at bureaucratic quality: Here we find that low bureaucratic quality matters more for non-RR countries. At the same time, some findings suggest that RR countries with higher levels of governance in terms of political regime and state capacity could in fact be more vulnerable to ToT shocks, perhaps due to higher degree of world market integration and reliance on external borrowing as an insurance mechanism.
Overall, the somewhat fuzzy picture of the effect of governance factors in RR countries can be explained by the fact that revenue from natural resources is often easier to collect and control than revenue from other sources. This is especially true for drilling (oil and gas), less for mining. Autocratic and corrupt governments could even have some additional levers to extract revenue from resource industries in bad times. Lastly, low governance levels in general do not necessarily mean bad resource management -some countries may perform poorly in almost all public policy areas, but are still highly effective in collecting revenues from the extractive industries. In this sense, our findings are in line with the existing literature on the political resource curse.
Measuring volatility
Volatility of tax revenue is measured by specifying the trend equation:
where y is the variable whose level of instability we want to find, t is time, and e t is the residual at time t. To obtain the index we use the formula:
where y is the arithmetic mean of y, y t is the observed value of y in year t and ˆ y t is the estimated value of y, from (2), in year t. The square root term in (I) yields the standard deviation of residuals from a quadratic time trend, as the mean of the residuals is necessarily zero. This is divided by the arithmetic mean of y to normalise the index, enabling crosscountry comparisons to be made. The variable t 2 is included in the time trend to pick up possible non-linearities. The index is to be interpreted as the typical deviation of the variable from a quadratic time trend over the period. As such it records average volatility over this period.
Tables: Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; HIC = high-income countries; UMIC = upper-middle-income countries; LMIC = lower-middle-income countries; LIC = low-income countries; RR = resource-rich Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ER pressure = exchange rate pressure; ToT = terms of trade; Democr. = democratic; RR = resource-rich Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ER pressure = exchange rate pressure; ToT = terms of trade
